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IS BROWN DYING?  EXPLORING THE RESEGREGATION
TREND IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS+
DANIELLE R. HOLLEY*
INTRODUCTION
The fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education1 has trig-
gered significant reflection on the case, including its meaning, its
goals, and its legacy.  In order to understand whether a Supreme
Court case is still relevant, it is helpful to know what makes a Su-
preme Court case relevant or important when it is first decided.2
The relevance and importance of the Brown decision operate on so
many different levels that it would be impossible in one hour or
one single year fully to examine the ramifications of this seminal
Supreme Court decision.
+ This essay was prepared for the conference Brown is Dead? Long Live Brown!,
held at New York Law School on April 29, 2004.
* Associate Professor of Law, Hoftsra University.  J.D. Harvard Law School, 1999.
The author would like to thank the organizers of the conference, especially Denise
Morgan and Chris Kendall.  The author also acknowledges the helpful feedback and
comments provided by Joanna Grossman, Linda McClain, Eric Freedman, and the par-
ticipants of the 2004 Northeast People of Color Conference, where an earlier draft of
this essay was the subject of a workshop.  Finally, the author would like to thank Dariely
Rodriguez, Krista Smokowski, and Natalie Edie for their invaluable research assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Mark Tushnet has argued that in assessing the impact of a Supreme Court
decision both short-term and long-term effects of the decision must be examined.
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  In the case
of Brown, the short term victory was that legally sanctioned segregation was declared
unconstitutional. Id. at 135-36.  In the long term, after a decade it was clear that the
decision was being ignored by local authorities. Id.  Thus, should the measure of suc-
cess for Brown be actual desegregation of the schools or the long term change in public
opinion about the propriety or justice of legally sanctioned explicit school segregation?
Id.
Tushnet argues that Supreme Court decisions also have separate ideological and
material effects:  In Brown, the ideological victory was that the Supreme Court’s pro-
nouncement that legally sanctioned segregation in schools is unconstitutional became
embedded in the public’s consciousness. Id.  Supreme Court decisions may also be
measured by the legal outcomes and political outcomes of the decisions.  For every
decision there are four possibilities:  (1) win legal and political; (2) win legal and lose
political; (3) lose legal and win political; and (4) lose legal and political. Id.
1085
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The obvious impact that Brown had was the end of de jure racial
segregation in our public schools.  The more controversial and
ongoing debate surrounding one of Brown’s legacies is whether
Brown was intended to or actually did achieve any level of sustained
success in actually integrating our public schools.3  This essay ap-
proaches the question whether Brown is dead by focusing on the
impact that Brown has today on the racial integration of our public
schools.  There is clear evidence that after Brown there was signifi-
cant racial integration of our nation’s public schools.4  One method
of measuring Brown’s continuing vitality is to examine whether our
schools are continuing down the path of racial integration or re-
gressing towards increased segregation.
The goal of this essay is to examine closely the resegregation
trend in school districts where court-ordered desegregation decrees
have ended.  A 2004 study by the Harvard Civil Rights Project
(“CRP”) entitled Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare?
identifies the trend towards resegregation in American public
schools.5  CRP notes that schools are more segregated today than
they were twenty years ago, and that the trend towards resegrega-
tion continues.6  CRP also notes that the percentage of African
American students attending majority white schools peaked in 1988
at 43.5%.7  By 2001, the number of African American children at-
tending majority-white institutions had declined to 30.2%, the low-
est level since 1968.8  CRP reports that by the 2000-01 school year,
3. See generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS (2004) (arguing that in Brown
the Supreme Court should have held that black schools should be made equal, valuing
equality of education over racial integration).
4. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNI-
VERSITY, Brown at 50:  King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? 18 (2004), available at http:/
/www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/resegregation04.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2005).  This study specifically looks at patterns of segregation after the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) The study
found “[d]uring the period when executive agencies and courts actively enforced de-
segregation (1964-1970), the percent of black students in white schools increased more
than 14-fold in six years.  Over the next eighteen years, to the high point in 1988, the
increase in the share of black students in majority white schools was about 33 percent.”
ORFIELD & LEE, supra at 19.
5. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 4, at 4.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 18.
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the average white student was attending a school that was 79%
white.9  The average African American student was attending
schools that were approximately 54% African American and 30%
white.10  The average Latino student was attending schools that
were 54% Latino, and 28% white.11  Even more disturbing is CRP’s
finding that many students are attending intensely segregated
schools, defined as schools that are 90-100% single race.12  As of
2001, fifty-one percent of African American students in the North-
east and 46.8% of African American students in the Midwest attend
intensely segregated schools.13  Latino students face similar condi-
tions in our public schools.14  Thus, fifty years after Brown, a large
majority of African American and Latino students attend segre-
gated schools.15
In many school districts in which court-ordered desegregation
has ended, the level of resegregation has increased in the school
district.  I identify the district court cases where lifting of a desegre-
gation decree has led to resegregation in the affected school district
as “district court resegregation cases.”  The goal of this essay is to
analyze district court resegregation cases.
Unlike this essay, much of the legal scholarship on Brown and
subsequent desegregation cases focuses on Supreme Court deci-
sions.  The Supreme Court decisions in the early 1990s in Board of
Education v. Dowell,16 Freeman v. Pitts,17 and Missouri v. Jenkins18 re-
ceived significant treatment from legal scholars.  Many pointed out
that this trilogy of decisions made it easier for desegregation de-
crees to be lifted and signaled the beginning of the end for wide-
spread court-ordered desegregation.  I call these three 1990s cases
that substantially limited district court remedies for segregation the
“Supreme Court resegregation cases.”  In contrast to Brown, Green v.
9. Id. at 16-17.
10. Id. at 17.
11. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 4, at 17.
12. See id. at 20-21.
13. See id. at 20.
14. See id. at 21.
15. See id. at 31.
16. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
17. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
18. 515 U.S. 1139 (1995).
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New Kent County School Board,19 and many earlier Supreme Court
decisions in the desegregation area that expanded remedies in de-
segregation cases, the Supreme Court resegregation cases limited
the court ordered remedies available in desegregation cases.
This essay will focus on district court resegregation cases that
followed from the Supreme Court resegregation cases.  My goal is
not to state definitively the causes of the resegregation trend in our
public schools.  In order to legitimately identify the causes of the
resegregation trend significant empirical work must be done to iso-
late the many factors that are at issue, including demographic shifts
that have made our school districts more racially isolated in the last
thirty years.  Instead, this essay will identify commonalities in the
district court resegregation cases.  There are several significant simi-
larities in the district court resegregation cases related to the ac-
tions of the parties (plaintiffs, defendants, and the United States as
intervening party), and the district courts that may aid in the larger
project of identifying the causes of the resegregation trend.
In Part I of this essay I will briefly describe the history of court-
ordered desegregation, and the role that district courts have played
in crafting school desegregation plans.  In Part II of this essay I will
examine the Supreme Court resegregation cases of the early 1990s,
and the subsequent analysis of those cases by legal scholars.  In Part
III of this essay I will look beyond the Supreme Court resegregation
cases and describe the commonalities in the district court resegre-
gation cases.  Finally, in Part IV of this essay I will analyze the impli-
cations of these commonalities in the district court resegregation
cases and areas that should be addressed in these cases.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COURT ORDERED DESEGREGATION
In 1954, the Supreme Court famously declared in Brown that de
jure segregated schools were “inherently unequal.”20  At the time of
Brown the Supreme Court did not provide a remedy for the plain-
tiffs in that case or explain how the school districts should desegre-
gate.21  A year later, in Brown II, the court declared that schools
19. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that the time for “all deliberate speed” had
ended).
20. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
21. Id. at 495-96.
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operating under these now unconstitutional schemes should deseg-
regate with “all deliberate speed.”22  This lack of urgency in the Su-
preme Court’s declaration lead to a corresponding lack of
significant progress towards desegregation in many Southern
schools, because local school boards actively resisted the Supreme
Court’s holding in Brown.23  The Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown II also failed to fully define the remedy for the constitutional
violation due to the vagueness of the “all deliberate speed”
standard.24
The Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Green signaled the true
beginning of federal court supervision of the desegregation of local
schools.25  In Green, the Court declared that the time for “all delib-
erate speed” had ended.26  The Supreme Court put the burden on
local school boards to develop plans to be approved by federal
courts to desegregate their schools in all areas including:  student
assignment, faculty assignment, transportation, and extracurricular
22. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter “Brown II ”]. See
also NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:  THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN 202-206
(2004) (giving an account of the genesis of the “all deliberate speed” formulation).
23. See Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 23, 24 (1992) (describing the various forms of resistance used by southern
school systems in the wake of Brown, including “passive resistance” in the form of
facially race neutral student assignment plans that perpetuated single race schools, and
“massive resistance” in states such as Virginia where the state legislature passed statutes
to continue segregation and block lawsuits through the assertion of Eleventh Amend-
ment Immunity); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (stating that after the decision in Brown the
Dekalb County school district in Georgia took no “positive action” towards desegrega-
tion until 1966-1967).
24. John H. Blume et al., Education and Interrogation: Comparing Brown and Mi-
randa, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 321, 339 (2005); Meredith Lee Bryant, Combatting School
Resegregation Through Housing: A Need For a Reconceptualization of American Democracy and
the Rights it Protects, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 159-60 (1997).
25. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Green, there was widespread resis-
tance to Brown and little progress in the actual racial integration of public schools. See
ORFIELD, & LEE, supra note 4, at 17 (explaining “[t]here was only the tiniest token of
progress during the first ten years following Brown, where 98 percent of Southern black
students remained in all black schools a decade later.  The resistance to even the most
modest changes was extreme in almost every place in the South.”).
26. Green, 391 U.S. at 436.
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activities.27  These became known as the Green factors for unitary
status.28
In the wake of Green, many lawsuits were brought by African
American parents seeking to have their schools desegregated.  In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme
Court indicated that federal district courts had full authority to su-
pervise and craft desegregation orders.29  At the height of federal
court supervision of school desegregation, approximately 500
schools were under federal desegregation orders.30
II. DOWELL, FREEMAN, JENKINS: THE SUPREME COURT
RESEGREGATION CASES
Approximately thirty-five years after the Brown decision, a num-
ber of school districts under court ordered desegregation decrees
sought to have federal district courts lift those desegregation or-
ders.  In a trilogy of early 1990s Supreme Court cases, the Court
made it easier for school districts to have desegregation orders
lifted. Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins are usually highlighted as evi-
dence of the Supreme Courts’ current hostility towards federal
court supervision of school desegregation.31
In Dowell, the Board of Education of Oklahoma City (“Board”)
sought to dissolve a desegregation decree ordered by a federal dis-
trict court in 1972.32  After only five years operating under this de-
27. Id. at 435, 439.
28. Cathryn Vaughn, The School Choice Provision of No Child Left Behind and Its Con-
flict with Desegregation Orders, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 79, 84, 94 n.49 (2003).
29. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
30. See Martha McCarthy, Elusive “Unitary Status,” 69 EDUC. L. REP. 9, 11 (1992),
citing Integration Questions Remain in Wake of High Court Ruling, EDUC. DAILY, Jan. 17,
1991, at 1.
31. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U.L. REV.
1157, 1158 (2000) (arguing that the Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins decisions in the 1990s
signalled the Supreme Court’s “reflexively hostile” view of desegregation litigation);
ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that a decade of resegregation has followed
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dowell).  Prior to these decisions in the early
1990s, there were several other Supreme Court decisions that limited remedies in de-
segregation.  For example, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court invalidated a court
ordered desegregation decree that called for a interdistrict remedies. See Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See also GARY ORFIELD & S.E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEG-
REGATION THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996).
32. 498 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1991).
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segregation order the school board moved for, and the district
court found that the through successful implementation of the de-
segregation plan the school district had achieved “unitary” status.33
The district court further found that lifting of the desegregation
decree would not result in the school district destroying its unitary
status.34
Several years after the desegregation decree was lifted, the
Board adopted a Student Reassignment Plan (“SRP”) that would
end busing and allow neighborhood school assignment for K-4 stu-
dents, and continue busing for the higher grades.35  African Ameri-
can parents sought to challenge the SRP by reopening the original
desegregation litigation.36  The African American parents argued
that the SRP plan proposed by the Board would lead to resegrega-
tion of many of the schools.37  The district court held that its previ-
ous order granting unitary status to the school district precluded
further court supervised desegregation.38  The Tenth Circuit re-
33. The term “unitary” as used in the desegregation cases originated in Green, in
which the Supreme Court stated the goal of a school desegregation order is to achieve a
“unitary, nonracial system of public education.” Green, 391 U.S. at 436.  Unitary status is
achieved when a school system no longer discriminates against children on the basis of
race, by eliminating all vestiges of state sponsored segregation. Coalition to Save Our
Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Green, 391 U.S. at
436, 442). In the early 1990s cases, the Supreme Court stated that the term “unitary”
has no “fixed meaning.” See Freeman, 503 U.S. at. 487.  Instead, a district court ap-
proaching the issue of whether a school district has achieved “unitary” status should ask:
(1) whether the school board has complied in good faith with the desegregation de-
cree, and (2) whether the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the
extent practicable. See Dowell, 498 U.S. 237. See also Berry v. School Dist., 195 F. Supp.
2d 971, 975 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (stating the issues for the unitary status hearing were:
(1) whether racial disparities in the Green factors (student and faculty assignment,
transportation, facilities, extracurricular activities) had been alleviated; (2) whether
other vestiges of segregation remain (such as achievement gap); (3) whether the defen-
dants complied in good faith).
34. Dowell, 491 U.S. at 240-41.
35. See id. at 242.  A student assignment or reassignment plan is the method used
by a school district to assign students to particular schools with the school district.
Some typical student assignment/reassignment plans include neighborhood assign-
ment, student choice, and magnet schools.
36. Id.
37. Id. (stating that under the SRP eleven of sixty-four schools would be greater
than 90% African American, and 22 of the elementary schools would be greater than
90% white).
38. Id. at 243.
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versed the district court’s opinion and held that the original deseg-
regation order was still in effect.39
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision.  The Court concluded that when a district court is
deciding whether to lift a desegregation decree the court should
consider whether the defendant school board “had complied in
good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and
whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to
the extent practicable.”40  More importantly for future cases was the
Court’s conclusion that despite indications that the SRP would lead
to significant resegregation in the school district, there would be no
remedy for the plaintiffs unless they could demonstrate that the
school board’s adoption of the SRP was motivated by racial
animus.41
Dowell represents a crucial moment in the legacy of Brown, and
for the current trend towards resegregation.  CRP notes that much
of the resegregation that has taken place in the last fifteen years
occurred after the Supreme Court’s decision in this case.42  While it
may be impossible definitively to link resegregation to a single Su-
preme Court decision, Dowell did and will continue to have a signifi-
cant impact on court supervised desegregation orders, because
Dowell makes it possible for district courts to lift desegregation de-
crees even though there is a strong possibility that alternatives to
the plan will lead to resegregation of schools.  The decision sig-
naled to district courts and school boards that after a desegregation
decree is lifted a school board has no further obligation to maintain
student assignment plans that would sustain the desegregation at-
tained under the court order.  While it may be debated whether
there should be any continuing obligation for the school board af-
ter the decree is lifted, it is clear that under Dowell the possibility of
resegregation is not an important factor in a federal court’s deci-
sion regarding whether to lift a desegregation decree.
In Freeman, the Supreme Court continued the trend of Dowell,
and made it easier for school boards to have desegregation decrees
39. Id.
40. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
41. Id. at 250.
42. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 4, at 9-10.
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lifted.  The Supreme Court held that where a school district has
achieved compliance with some aspects of a desegregation plan, the
district court need not retain control over those aspects of the case
while the school district seeks unitary status in other areas.43  In
effect, the case allows the partial release of school boards from a
desegregation decree before the school district meets every require-
ment of the decree.
The Dekalb County schools were ordered to desegregate in
1969.44  The school district worked with the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to devise a desegregation plan.45  The
school district adopted a neighborhood school assignment plan, in
which all of the schools created for black students under de jure
segregation were closed, and students were assigned to neighbor-
hood schools.46  In 1986, the school district sought to have the case
dismissed, claiming that the school district had achieved unitary sta-
tus.  The district court found that Dekalb County achieved unitary
status as to student assignments, transportation, physical facilities
and extra curricular activities.47  The district court also found that
unitary status had not been achieved in the areas of teacher and
principal assignments, resource allocations, and quality of educa-
tion.48  As a result of these findings, the district court partially lifted
the desegregation order in the areas in which unitary status had
been achieved.
The Supreme Court held that school districts may be released
from a desegregation order in increments.49  The Court held that
the fact that single-race schools exist in the school system does not
mean that the school system is a continuing dual system that re-
quires remediation.  The Supreme Court focused on the causal
connection between the school system’s acts to sustain de jure segre-
43. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471 & 489 (“holding “a federal court in a school desegre-
gation case has the discretion to order an incremental or partial withdrawal of its super-
vision and control.”).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 472.
46. Id. at 473.
47. Id. at 474.
48. Id.
49. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471 (holding that a district court may withdraw its super-
vision over discrete areas in which the school district has complied with a desegregation
plan).
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gation and current conditions in the schools.  The Court concluded
that if current segregation in the school system is to be redressed,
segregation must have been caused by the original constitutional
violation.
The similarities with Dowell are clear.  In Freeman, the Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of returning school administra-
tion to local control, and ending supervision by the federal court.
The Court noted that local autonomy of school districts is a na-
tional tradition, and that returning schools to local control is essen-
tial for their accountability to the governmental system.50  Also, in
both Dowell and Freeman the Court focused almost solely on the link
between that lingering segregation and past constitutional
violations.51
The Dekalb County Schools sought release from the desegre-
gation order at a time when it was clear that their schools remained
intensely segregated.  While there were demographic changes in
Dekalb County, the number of blacks and whites attending schools
in the district was almost equal.  Black students made up 47% of the
students in the district.52  The Supreme Court noted that in the
1986-1987 school year, 50% of all the black students in the district
attended schools that were over 90% black.53  Also, of the 22 high
schools in the district, 10 of the high schools had populations that
were 80% one race.54  Thus in Freeman, actual lingering segregation
and the possibility of increasing resegregation did not deter the Su-
preme Court from finding that the desegregation decree should be
lifted.
In Jenkins, the Supreme Court continued to limit the district
court’s ongoing remedial authority in desegregation cases.  This de-
segregation case began in 1977, twenty-three years after the Court’s
50. Id. at 490.  The Court then stated that when school boards make decisions
without judicial supervision they are held accountable to the citizenry.  The flaw in this
assertion is that desegregation decrees are remedies for a school district’s violation of
an individual’s constitutional rights.  The courts should be responsible for crafting and
supervising remedies for constitutional violations.
51. See Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up?  Current Issues in School Desegregation,
42 EMORY L. J. 863, 866 (1993) (noting that both the district courts and Supreme Court
in Dowell and Freeman focused on the causation issue).
52. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 476.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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decision in Brown, and a remedial order was not in place until 1985,
over thirty years after Brown.55  The facts of Jenkins differ from many
desegregation cases in that it was the school board who filed suit as
a plaintiff against the state, alleging that the state “had caused and
perpetuated a system of racial segregation in the schools of the Kan-
sas City metropolitan area.”56
The Supreme Court determined that the district court’s order
to increase teacher salaries as part of the desegregation plan was
beyond the district court’s remedial authority.  The Supreme Court
more broadly held that the district court’s orders which were de-
signed to attract white students from the suburbs to the urban
schools were also beyond the district court’s authority, because they
attempted to create an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict con-
stitutional violation.
The Court also continued its focus as in Freeman of closely link-
ing any remedial action to those disparities created by the defen-
dant’s illegal actions.  Under this “incremental effect” standard
school boards may attribute racial disparities in the schools to
outside factors such as demographic shifts and socioeconomic sta-
tus.57  Thus, as in Dowell and Freeman in the face of lingering racial
disparities, the Court allowed the district court’s remedial powers to
be limited.
III. DISTRICT COURT RESEGREGATION CASES
CRP asserts that there has been more than a decade of resegre-
gation following the Supreme Court’s decision in Dowell.58  CRP’s
recent study identifies a total of thirty-eight school districts where
unitary status has been declared since Dowell, specifically between
1990-2002.59  In thirty-four of the school districts that gained uni-
tary status there was resegregation, measured as a decrease in the
55. Id. at 474.
56. Id.
57. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 1172. See Parker, supra note 31, at 1172.
58. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 4, at 18 (explaining “[t]his resegregation is
linked to the impact of three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995 limiting
school desegregation and authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools,
decisions which were interpreted by a number of Southern courts as prohibiting even
voluntary race-conscious plans to maintain desegregated schools where local authorities
believed integration to be a crucial goal.”).
59. Id. at 38.
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exposure of black students to white students, and the exposure of
Latino students to white students.60  I call these district court cases
in which the district court declared unitary status for a school dis-
trict and resegregation followed “district court resegregation cases.”
In the large majority of the thirty-four schools where resegregation
occurred there was a more than a 10% decline in the exposure
black students and Latino students to white students.61  In only four
school districts there were gains in desegregation after the desegre-
gation decree was lifted.62
An examination of the district court resegregation cases reveals
many commonalities.  They include:  (1) the initiation of unitary
status proceedings by the defendant school board; (2) a short
amount of time after the desegregation order was entered that the
school board sought unitary status; (3) a lack of opposition by
plaintiffs or the United States to the declaration of unitary status;
(4) increasing resegregation even prior to the formal lifting of the
desegregation decree; and (5) arguments by defendant school
boards that resegregation is inevitable due to demographic shifts
and other factors.
First, in many of the district court resegregation cases the de-
fendant school district moved for unitary status.63  In these cases it
60. Id.  The thirty-four school districts identified by CRP as experiencing resegre-
gation after the unitary status are:  Alexander City, Ala., Benton Harbor area schools,
Mich., Brandywine School District, Del., Buffalo City School Districts, N.Y., Butler
County, Ala., Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, N.C., Chatham County, Ga., Christina
School District, Del., Cincinnati City SD, Ohio, Coffee County, Ga., Colonial School
District, Del., Dade County School District, Fla., Dallas ISD, Tex., Dayton County SD,
Ohio, Dekalb County, Ga., Denver County, Colo., Duval County School District, Fla.,
Gadsen City, Ala., Hillsborough County School District, Fla., Indianapolis Public
Schools, Ind., Jefferson County, Ky., Kansas City, Kan. Little Rock, Ark., Muscogee
County, Ga., Oklahoma City, Okla., Opelika City, Ala., Pontiac City School District,
Mich., Prince George’s County Public Schools, Md., Red Clay Consolidated School Dis-
trict, Del., Rockford School Dist 205, Ill., Russell County, Ala., San Diego City Unified,
Cal., St. Lucie County School District, Fla., Topeka Public Schools, Kan.
61. Id. at 35-36.
62. Id. at 38.  The four school districts with increasing desegregation after the
desegregation decree was lifted were Auburn City, Ala., Jefferson ISD, Tex., Lee
County, Ala., Tallapoosa County, Ala.
63. See, e.g., Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 758
(3d Cir. 1996) (in which Delaware State Board of Education moved for unitary status);
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 1995 WL 224537 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Arthur v. Nyquist, 904 F.
Supp. 112, 114 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (in which Buffalo City School District sought unitary
status); Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1994).  In contrast to these
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was the school district, and not the federal district court that sought
to end the federal court supervision of the school district’s desegre-
gation efforts.64  For example, in Dowell, after only five years of
court supervised desegregation the school district sought to have
the desegregation decree lifted.
Upon first glance it seems routine that a school district under a
court order would seek to have that court supervision lifted.  Al-
though there have been thirty-eight cases where unitary status has
been declared since 1991, there is evidence that the Dowell, Freeman,
and Jenkins opinions did not immediately lead a large number of
school boards to seek to have desegregation decrees lifted.  In 2000,
Wendy Parker published a comprehensive study of desegregation
cases in six states comprising the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
cases, in the six Alabama cases identified as experiencing resegregation, the unitary
status proceedings began when a federal district court ordered eleven Alabama school
districts to “move toward ‘unitary’ status” and the “termination of litigation.” See Lee v.
Auburn City Bd. Of Educ., 2002 WL 237091, *4 (2002).
64. Although there have been thirty-eight cases where unitary status has been de-
clared, there is some evidence that the Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins opinions did not
immediately lead a large number of school boards to seek to have desegregation de-
crees lifted.  In 2000, Wendy Parker published a comprehensive study of desegregation
cases in six states comprising the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.  Parker concluded that
while some large school districts in these states were released from their desegregation
cases, a greater number of these lawsuits continue. See Parker, supra note 30, at 1187-
1206.  Parker conducted two separate empirical studies to assess the current state of
school desegregation in the South.  In the first study, Parker examined 126 published
opinions from federal courts in all six states.  In the second study Parker looked at
docket sheets in desegregation cases in the Middle District of Alabama, Middle District
of Georgia, and the Northern District of Mississippi. Id. at 1187.  Parker found that in
all six states only twenty-eight school districts were involved in unitary status proceed-
ings, and that in only six of these proceedings did the school district itself raise the
unitary status issue. Id. at 1189-90.
Parker also concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dowell had little effect
on a defendant’s decision to request unitary status. Id. at 1192.  After Dowell, only eight
school districts requested unitary status and in four additional school districts the dis-
trict court raised the unitary status issue sua sponte. Id.
Parker offers several theories as to why defendant school districts are not initiating
unitary status proceedings. Id. at 1208.  Parker argues that mostly large school districts
initiate unitary status proceedings. Id.  Parker’s study demonstrates that of the 132 very
large school districts in the six states studied, 11.4% seek unitary status, while only 1%
of 1,265 small districts sought unitary status. Id.  This is an indication that small and
mid-size school districts do not have the legal or monetary resources to initiate these
proceedings. See id. at 1207-09.  Also, larger school district may be more likely to en-
counter the demographic obstacles to integration “allowing them to offer plausible ex-
cuses or rationales for a segregated student body.” Id at 1209.
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Parker concluded that while some large school districts in these
states were released from their desegregation cases, a greater num-
ber of these lawsuits continue.  Therefore, it is noteworthy that in
the district court resegregation cases many of the school districts
initiated the unitary status proceedings.  The initiation of unitary
status proceedings by the defendant school district is an important
common feature in the district court resegregation cases because it
points out this important contrast.  It is not a foregone conclusion
that the lifting of a desegregation decree will automatically lead to
resegregation.  These district court cases demonstrate that when a
school district seeks unitary status, instead of a court initiating that
process, resegregation is a common result.
Another common factor in the district court resegregation
cases is the timing of the school district’s early efforts to have the
desegregation decree lifted.  In many of the district court resegre-
gation cases the school district sought to have the desegregation
order lifted less than twenty-one years after the decree was put in
place.65  I characterize these school district decisions as “early” be-
cause in most of these cases the unconstitutional system on de jure
segregation was in place for many decades, and even after Brown
many of the school districts refused to comply with the holding in
Brown without the formal entering of a desegregation order by a
district court.66
Perhaps the most surprising commonality in these cases is that
in a number of cases the plaintiffs, or United States as intervening
party, concede that unitary status has been met, without attention
to the  possibility that resegregation will result from the lifting of
the court order.67  One possible explanation for the lack of resis-
65. See, e.g., Coalition to Save Our Children, 90 F.3d at 757-58 (unitary status sought
seventeen years after desegregation order entered); United States v. Bd. of Educ., 1995
WL 224537 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (unitary status sought after 25 years); Arthur v. Nyquist, 904
F. Supp. at 114 (unitary status sought after 16 years).
66. See, e.g., Charles Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal District
Courts and the Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968-1974, 32 AKRON L. REV.
471 (1999). HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, 101 (1976); Billy G. Bridges, The Forty Year Fight to
Desegregate Public Education in the Fifth Circuit and In Particular Mississippi, 16 MISS. C. L.
REV. 289, 306-07 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Berry v. School Dist. 195 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (in
which plaintiffs in the desegregation case conceded that “Green” factors for unitary
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tance by plaintiffs may be the increase of racial diversity on the local
school boards in the South.  The increase in the number of African
American members on Southern school boards may lead African
American plaintiffs to believe that the school board will act in good
faith in the area of desegregation, even without federal court super-
vision.68  For example, in Alabama, including in Opelika City and
Auburn where plaintiffs conceded that unitary status criteria were
partially met, the school boards include black members.69  Plaintiffs
may feel more comfortable that a racially diverse school board will
not adopt intentional policies designed to maintain or increase ra-
cial segregation in the schools.
The increased level of racial diversity on school boards may
also contribute to a federal district court’s willingness to grant uni-
tary status.70  In several of the school districts in Georgia where uni-
tary status was declared, including Muscogee County and Coffee
County, there is African American representation on the defendant
school board.71  In Muscogee County, one third of the school board
is African American.  In the desegregation case in Dallas ISD, Texas
the district court specifically noted the increased racial diversity of
the defendant school board when describing the background facts
of the case.72
status were met); Auburn City Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 237091, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (in
which plaintiffs conceded that the school board met standards for unitary status on the
issues on student assignment and transportation); Lee v. Opelilka City Bd. of Educ.,
2002 WL 237032, *2–*4 (M.D. Ca. 2002) (in which plaintiffs agreed at status confer-
ence that the actions of the schools board indicated compliance with the desegregation
order and that the case should be terminated).
68. The increased level of racial diversity on school boards may also contribute to
a federal district court’s willingness to grant unitary status.  In several of the school
districts in Georgia where unitary status was declared, including Muscogee County and
Coffee County, there was black representation on the defendant school board.  In Mus-
cogee County one third of the school board is African American.
69. See www.alsde.edu (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
70. See Alfred A. Lindseth, The Changing Vision of Equality in Education: Response: A
Different Perspective: A School Board Attorney’s Viewpoint, 42 EMORY L.J. 879, 882 (1993)
(arguing that current school desegregation cases rarely involve intentional discrimina-
tion because school boards are now made up of members of all races and are working
in good faith).
71. See www.doe.k12.ga.us (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
72. See Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1994).  The court noted
that in 1994, the school board was comprised of three African American members, two
Hispanic members, and four Caucasian members.  Despite this numerical diversity, the
racial diversity of the school board did not prevent the school board from seeking to lift
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African American plaintiffs may also concede aspects of the
unitary status requirements because racial balance in the student
populations in the schools has significantly improved under the de-
segregation plan.  The acknowledgement by black plaintiffs that
there are racially balanced student populations in the district
schools is sometimes viewed by district courts as conceding that uni-
tary status should be granted.  However, racial balance in the stu-
dent population is not the only issue that African American
plaintiffs would like a school district to address before unitary status
is declared.
For example, in the Brandywine School District case, the Afri-
can American plaintiffs/appellants conceded racial balance in the
student population in the school district, but argued that segrega-
tion continued to thrive within schools.73  The African American
plaintiffs claimed that minority students were overrepresented in
special education and underrepresented in gifted classes.  Despite
this claim the district court granted unitary status, arguing that a
school district is not required to create racial balance in each
school, grade or classroom.
Another important commonality in the district court resegre-
gation cases is that the United States, as either an intervenor or a
plaintiff, has played only a minor role in opposing unitary status.
For example, in the desegregation case in Coffee County, Georgia,
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
approved the desegregation plan created by the school district in
1969.74  In 1994, the school district sought unitary status and the
Department of Justice did not oppose unitary status.  One possible
explanation for this is that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins indicate that the Court is no longer supportive
of ongoing remedial measures in these cases.  The Department of
Justice and the Solicitor General’s office have historically played an
important role in Brown and its enforcement.75  Notwithstanding
the desegregation decree.  The three African American school board members op-
posed the decision to seek unitary status, and claimed that they were disenfranchised
on the board because many important votes were cast entirely along racial lines. Id.
73. Coalition to Save Our Children, 90 F.3d at 762.
74. United States v. Bd. of Educ. 1995 WL 224537 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
75. See NORMAN I. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILLIP ELMAN
(2004) (describing the role played by the Solicitor General’s office in Brown).
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the Supreme Court’s current hostility towards court supervised de-
segregation, the Department of Justice should continue to rigor-
ously investigate and oversee desegregation cases to determine
whether court supervision is still needed.
Another common factor in the district court resegregation
cases is that resegregation had already begun prior to the district
court’s declaration of unitary status.  In Freeman, the Dekalb County
Schools sought release from the desegregation order at a time
when it was clear that their schools remained intensely segregated.
The number of blacks and whites attending the Dekalb County
Schools were almost equal, with black students made up 47% of the
students in the district.76  Despite this racial balance in the overall
school population, 50% of all the black students in the district at-
tended schools that were over 90% black.77  Also, of the twenty-two
high schools in the district, 10 of the high schools had populations
that were 80% one race.78  The Dekalb County Schools and the Su-
preme Court concluded that although there were significant num-
bers of intensely segregated schools in the school district, the
lingering segregation could not be traced to the previous unconsti-
tutional acts of the school board.79 Green allows a court to consider
whether a school district has complied in good faith with a desegre-
gation decree.80  Plaintiffs may want to argue that a school district’s
knowledge that there is already resegregation occurring at the time
of the unitary status proceeding is an indication of bad faith on the
part of school district.81
Another common factor in the district court resegregation
cases is that in these cases the school districts rely heavily on factors
such as shifting racial demographics to explain lingering single race
76. Id. at 476.
77. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 476.
78. Id.
79. Id at 494.
80. Green, 391 U.S. at 436.
81. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977) (stating that looking at the impact of state action is an important start-
ing point in determining whether the state engaged in acts of intentional discrimina-
tion); Reno v. Bossier Parrish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 489 (1997) (same).
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schools and resegregation.82  School districts have been able suc-
cessfully to deflect their culpability in the resegregation trend by
pointing to demographis factors.  In Manning, the desegregation
case in Hillsborough County School District, Florida the school
board contended that the presence of some racially identifiable
schools in the district were caused by demographic shifts in the
district.83
In Coalition to Save Our Children, the school board argued that
persisting disparities in performance between black students and
white students were caused by socioeconomic factors.84  The school
board presented demographic data from the 1990 Census to
demonstrate that black students in the school district, are on aver-
age, from families of lower socioeconomic status.85  The school
board also presented evidence that this socioeconomic gap was the
cause of the achievement gap, and not persisting segregation in the
schools.86  The Third Circuit agreed that the achievement gap was
not a vestige of de jure segregation, but instead was caused by this
socioeconomic gap.
While it is obviously in the school district’s interest to attempt
to explain resegregation trends by referring to socioeconomic fac-
tors when requesting unitary status, district courts wrongly accept
this explanation without significant analysis.  In Hillsborough
County, without any analysis of the school districts claims the dis-
trict court concludes that “a shift in demographics was a substantial
cause” in creating racially identifiable schools.87  The district court
in Coalition to Save Our Schools also accepts without thorough analy-
82. See, e.g., Alfred A. Lindseth, supra note 70, at 882 (asserting that school boards
have little to do with lingering school segregation, because current segregation in
schools is primarily caused by housing segregation and other demographic patterns).
83. See Manning v. School Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 936-37 (11th Cir. 2001).  The courts
defined a “racially identifiable” school as any school with a black/white ratio varying
plus or minus 20 points from a 20/80 ratio.
84. See Coalition to Save Our Children, 90 F.3d at 777.
85. Id.
86. Id.; See Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784,
818-20 (D. Del. 1995) (citing 1990 U.S. Census statistics and 1992 Vital Statistics Report
of Delaware to demonstrate a “black/white gap” in education, socioeconomic status,
employment, and other areas).
87. Manning, 244 F.3d at 936-37.  The African American plaintiffs/appellees ar-
gued that demographic changes alone did not account for the presence of racially iden-
tifiable schools.
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sis that the achievement gap between black and white students is
due lingering societal racism and other factors, but not de jure seg-
regation in the schools.  The court stated:
The evidence also demonstrates that the intramural or
school environment cannot be expected to make up for
deficiencies in the child’s extramural environment.
There is no credible evidence demonstrating that the dif-
ferences between black and white children’s success in
school can be attributed to the former de jure segregated
school system.  The continued existence of racial discrimi-
nation in society as a whole, and the effect of that discrim-
ination on the ability of a black child to enter school on
an equal footing with more privileged white schoolmates,
are not matters in dispute in this litigation.88
Another important commonality in the district court resegre-
gation cases is that the United States, as either an intervenor or a
plaintiff, has played only a minor role in opposing unitary status.
For example, in the desegregation case in Coffee County, Georgia,
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
approved the desegregation plan created by the school district in
1969.89  In 1994, the school district sought unitary status and the
Department of Justice did not oppose unitary status.
Finally, the district court resegregation cases demonstrate that
Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins opened the door for lower courts to feel
increasingly empowered to grant unitary status.  A large majority of
the district court resegregation cases cite Dowell or Freeman for the
proposition that the goal in desegregation cases is to return the
schools to local control.  This perspective is one that shifts the goal
of desegregation cases from the creation of sustained racial integra-
tion of public schools, to local control of public schools, even if that
local control leads to resegregation.90  The lack of concern by fed-
eral district courts about resegregation as a possible outcome of
88. Coalition to Save Our Children, 901 F. Supp. at 823.
89. United States v. Bd. Of Educ., 1995 WL 224537 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
90. See Lee v. Tallapoosa County Bd. of Educ., 2002 US Dist LEXIS 23464, *15-
*16.(2002) (stating “[i]t has been long recognized that the goal of a school desegrega-
tion case is to promptly convert from a de jure segregated school system from a system
without “white” schools or “black” schools, but just schools.”), citing Green, 391 U.S. at
442.
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unitary status proceedings appears to be traceable to the Supreme
Court’s resegregation cases.
In the Brandywine School District, Delaware case, when grant-
ing unitary status the court emphasized the importance of local
control and cited Dowell and Freeman as authority.91  The court
stated:
We are keenly aware that, for as long as we have imposed
federal supervision on local school boards, those bodies
have suffered the loss of their defining function — con-
trol over their own schools.  Thus in the present matter
the citizens of the New Castle school districts have for
nearly 20 years what the Court has described as the ‘vital
national tradition’ of local autonomy of school districts.92
While the district court expresses interest in the concerns of
the “citizens of New Castle,” the court fails to discuss the effect on
the African American citizens/students of New Castle caused by de
jure segregation.  The district court also fails to acknowledge the
fact that when left to local control, the New Castle school officials
were found to have failed to comply with Brown’s mandate thirty-
four years after the Brown I decision.93  The district courts’ empha-
sis on local control and minimizing the other intrests in these cases
is a clear consequence of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins where the Court prioritized returning school
districts to local control.
IV. CONCLUSION: ADDRESSING THE DISTRICT COURT
RESEGREGATION CASES
The common factors that I have identified in the district court
resegregation cases suggest several issues in these cases that should
be addressed by advocates and courts that seek to insure that
Brown’s legacy in terms of creating racially integrated public schools
is not destroyed.  The commonalities in these cases may be ad-
dressed by defendant school districts, plaintiffs, and courts.  The
91. Coalition to Save Our Children, 90 F.3d at 760.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 757.  When the desegregation order was entered in 1978 the court made
a liability finding that state authorities had continually refused to desegregate the pub-
lic schools.
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need to combat resegregation is a topic that warrants significant
reflection and comprehensive study.  I offer the following sugges-
tions as the beginning of my own reflection on this difficult
problem.
Defendant school districts that are committed to maintaining
racial integration must approach desegregation decrees and the lift-
ing of desegregation decrees differently.  The district court resegre-
gation cases clearly demonstrate that after desegregation decrees
are lifted, there are events occurring within the school district that
are decreasing the level of desegregation that was attained under
court order.
Under our current law, the school district may be most effec-
tive at preventing resegregation, because the role of defendant
school systems in sustaining racial integration has been exaggerated
by the Supreme Court’s emphasis on returning schools to local con-
trol.94  The Supreme Court’s, and by extension the district courts’,
reliance on local school systems to govern themselves in the area of
desegregation may be horribly ill conceived, but the conclusion re-
mains that under our current legal precedents local school districts
have significant control over desegregation remedies.  Therefore, it
is vital to consider legal incentives to motivate schools boards to
maintain student assignment and resource plans that prevent
resegregation.  Incentives should be created to encourage school
districts to maintain student, teacher, and resource allocation plans
that create racially integrated schools, and to maintain those plans
even without court supervision.
These incentives may include monetary grants to school dis-
tricts that are able to maintain racial integration after the end of
court ordered desegregation.  Also, under federal legislation such
94. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (stating “[l]ocal control over the education of chil-
dren allows citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that
school programs can fit local needs.  Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local
authorities have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time prop-
erly recognizes that ‘necessary concern for the important values of local control of pub-
lic school systems dictates that a federal court’s regulatory control of such systems not
extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimina-
tion.’”) (internal citations omitted); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 (stating that local auton-
omy of school districts is a “vital national tradition” and that returning control of
schools to local authorities allows accountability to the citizens).
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as No Child Left Behind,95 the quality of a school should be par-
tially measured by its ability to create and maintain racially diverse
student bodies and faculties.  No Child Left Behind establishes ac-
countability standards for reading and math, and also requires that
statistics be kept on the progress of minority students.96  States and
the federal government should consider creating accountability
standards to measure racial integration.  The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Grutter v. Bollinger,97 affirmed a state’s right to consider race
in student admissions for the purpose of creating a racially diverse
student body.  Elementary and secondary schools should be en-
couraged to adopt race-conscious student assignment plans that
value racial diversity.
Although further efforts should be made to encourage local
school boards voluntarily to maintain plans for racially integrated
schools, it is clear from the district court resegregation cases that
the project of desegregation is currently more successful when the
school district is under a court order to desegregate.98  Thus, plain-
tiffs, both minority plaintiffs and the United States as intervenor or
plaintiff, should vigorously oppose granting of unitary status in any
school district where there is evidence of lingering racial segrega-
tion, or a strong possibility that resegregation will occur after the
desegregation decree is lifted.  In opposing the grant of unitary sta-
tus, the plaintiffs should emphasize that among the factors for uni-
tary status set forth in Green is whether the school district has
complied in good faith with the desegregation order.99  Part of the
district court’s evaluation of the school district’s good faith should
be whether the school district will maintain the plans that lead to
desegregation after the decree is lifted.  A school district operating
in good faith under a desegregation decree should be able to
demonstrate that they are committed to not allowing the school dis-
95. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001).
96. Id.
97. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that diversity among student body is compelling
state interest and that individualized evaluations may include considerations of all fac-
tors, including race and ethnicity, that contribute to diversity).
98. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 4, at 37 (“It is very clear, however, that desegrega-
tion is declining rapidly in places the federal courts no longer hold accountable and
that just a decade ago there were much higher levels of interracial contact.”).
99. See Green, 391 U.S. at 438.
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trict to return to the racially imbalanced student populations that
existed in the de jure segregation era.
Also, plaintiffs must challenge more vigilantly the blanket as-
sertion by school districts that lingering segregation is caused by
racial demographic shifts and other factors outside of the school
district’s control.  For example, much of the residential segregation
that plays a role in resegregation may be traced to previous acts by
the state of housing segregation.  Plaintiffs should attempt to
demonstrate when “demographic shifts” are connected to unconsti-
tutional or otherwise illegal acts by the state or local government.
School districts, minority plaintiffs, and our courts should be
joined in an effort to maintain Brown’s legacy.  The existence and
increasing nature of resegregation is a threat to that legacy.  If our
legal system hopes to prevent Brown’s legacy from perishing, there
must be a vigorous recommitment to the project of racial integra-
tion of our public schools.
One lesson of Brown is that it is ineffectual for our Supreme
Court to declare a right and leave those who have suffered from the
violation of their constitutional rights without an effective remedy.
The long term legacy of Brown will be judged by whether the deci-
sion fulfilled its promise.
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